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Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be 
Liable for Student to Student Injuries Under 
Section 1983? 
In recent years, the scope of civil rights claims under 42 
U.S.C. 5 1983 has been expanded.' This expansion has signifi- 
cantly affected public schools. Schools have become a place 
where the civil rights of students and employees have limited 
school officials' authority and augmented their responsibilities. 
For example, in a recent Texas case, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that a school principal could be held supe~sori ly 
liable when a teacher had sexual relations with a fifteen-year- 
old student? In New York, a federal district court allowed a 
student to bring a claim against his school for verbal and phys- 
ical abuse from other students3 In Utah, a teacher was fired 
after the school found out that the police arrested and charged 
him with selling drugs.' Later, the Salt Lake police depart- 
ment dismissed the charges when the teacher agreed to become 
1. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1988). 
2. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). In Doe, the principal's motion for summary judgment was 
denied and the case was remanded to the trial court to see if the principal's fail- 
ure to take corrective action against a teacher rose to the level of deliberate indif- 
ference. 
3. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). This 
case may be an aberration. Currently, six circuit courts have reached the opposite 
result based on the Supreme Court's holding in DeShaney v. winnebago County 
Department of Social Services, 489 US. 189 (1989). See infia note 116 and accom- 
panying text. 
However, there are exceptions to the DeShuney holding. These exceptions arise 
when the state creates a special relationship with individuals that are within the 
custody of the state. DeShuney, 489 U.S. at  198. According to the DeShuney Court, 
a special duty is created when the state takes individuals into custody, such as 
criminals and mental patients. Id. at 198-99. 
In Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals expanded the special relationship doctrine by holding that such a 
relationship was created when a child was put into a foster home. 649 F.2d 134 
(2d Cir. 1981). The Pagano court stated that Pagano was more akin to Doe than 
DeShaney. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643. Thus, the state owed a duty under the 
doctrine of parens patriae to the school children under its care at the time the 
incidents took place. Id. See generally Gail P. Sorenson, School District Liability for 
Federal Civil Rights Violations Under Section 1983, 76 EDUC. LAW REP. 3 13, 323- 
28 (1992) (discussing alternative justifications for allowing a special relationship in 
the public school context). 
4. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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an inf~rmant.~ The teacher then filed a suit against the school 
district for wrongful dismissal and was awarded over 
$200,000.6 
With such high stakes, school officials need to be aware of 
the liability that section 1983 creates for their schools. Of 
course, this is more easily said than done. Section 1983 juris- 
prudence is so complex that essential elements of a section 
1983 claim are easily overlooked.' Because section 1983 is so 
complex, this Comment cannot discuss all aspects of section 
1983 claims in the public school arena. Therefore, this Com- 
ment will focus on the section 1983 liability of school officials 
and districts when students injure other students (peer abuse). 
However, in order to understand the peer abuse issue, it is 
essential to know the background of section 1983 and the pri- 
ma facie elements necessary to  establish a section 1983 case in 
the educational arena. 
Thus, part I will give a brief history of section 1983. Part 
I1 will outline the elements needed to bring a cause of action 
under section 1983. Part I11 will analyze whether school offi- 
cials are or should be liable for deprivation of rights caused by 
peer abuse under section 1983. Part IV draws some conclusions 
from the analysis. 
A. The Early History of Section 1983 
Section 1983 was originally passed as section 1 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 187lO8 This Act was passed primarily in response 
to  the "growing terrorism of [the] Ku Klux Klan."g 
5. Id. 
6. Interview with Byron Fischer, attorney for the defendant Board of Educa- 
tion in Ambus, in Provo, Utah (Sept. 19, 1994). The amount of damages is not 
listed in the reported case. 
7. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-22 @. Utah 1994). 
Seamons involved a group of students hazing another student in a northern Utah 
school. Id. The court dismissed the 5 1983 claim because the plaintiff failed to 
show a constitutional interest that was deprived. Id. at 1122. For a discussion of 
the prima facie elements of a § 1983 claim, see i e a  part 11. 
8. Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews., 436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978); Leon 
Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983 
Actiom, C902 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 129, 131 (1994). 
9. See Friedman, wpm note 8, at  131. 
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The Act was passed essentially as introduced by Congress- 
man Samuel Shellabarger.l0 The part now codified as section 
1983 was passed without amendment and with very little de- 
bate." Thus, legislative history is scarce for interpreting sec- 
tion 1983. In spite of the lack of legislative history, the Su- 
preme Court has reasoned that Congress passed the Ku Klux 
Klan Act in order to  provide federal relief and remedies to 
individuals who were being deprived of their federal rights 
because local officials were unwilling or unable to  enforce the 
federal laws. l2 
Although this Act was passed in 1871, it was essentially 
disregarded for the first seventy years after its passage.13 It 
was not until 1939 that the Court held that the rights to as- 
semble and to distribute literature were within the protection 
of section 1983.14 This holding was the first modern holding 
by which citizens were protected from the states under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.15 However, the real power of section 
1983 was not recognized until Monroe u. Pape.16 
B. Monroe's Impact on Section 1983 
In 1961, the Court expanded the scope and power of sec- 
tion 1983 in Monroe u. Pape.17 In Monroe, thirteen Chicago 
police officers broke into James Monroe's apartment without a 
search warrant in the early morning.18 They routed the Mon- 
roe household from bed, "made them stand naked in the living 
room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and rip- 
ping mattress  cover^."'^ Mr. Monroe was also taken to  the po- 
lice station, held in custody for ten hours, and interrogated 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-76 (1961), overruled in part by 
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Steven S. Cushman, Munici- 
pal Liability Under 6 1983: Toward a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34 
B.C. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (1993). 
13. Friedman, supm note 8, at 135. 
14. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see Friedman, supra note 8, at 135. 
15. Friedman, supra note 8, at 135. 
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 
436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
18. Id. at 169. 
19. Id. 
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about a two-day-old murder2' He never saw a judge, no 
charges were filed against him, and he was not allowed to call 
his family or an att~rney.~' The Monroes brought a suit claim- 
ing among other things, that their civil rights had been violat- 
ed under section 1983.22 The City of Chicago and the officers 
moved t o  dismiss, claiming that section 1983 did not provide a 
cause of action.23 The U.S. Su~reme Court held that there was 
a cause of action for damages against the police officers, but 
not against the city? 
Monroe affected the law in two significant ways. First, 
section 1983 was expanded so plaintiffs could bring "damage 
suits against state  officer^."^' Previously, such suits had been 
limited t o  prospective injunctive relief.26 
Second, damages were available only against individuals. 
In Monroe, a municipality did not qualify as a "person" under 
section 1983.~' Thus, Chicago was not liable for the acts of the 
police officers? This second holding essentially exempted 
municipalities from liability for damages under section 1983.29 
The Court justified this holding based on the failed Sherman 
Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.30 The Sherman 
Amendment would have made a municipality liable for any 
acts of violence committed by riotous persons assembled within 
its b~undaries.~' This would have placed a tremendous burden 
on the municipality to keep the peace. Although section 1983 is 
much narrower than the Sherman Amendment, the Court used 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 170. 
24. Id. at 172, 187. 
25. Friedman, supm note 8, at 135. Such suits extend to state officers in 
their individual capacity, not their official capacity. If state officers were liable in 
their official capacity, it would be the same as the state being directly liable for 
the harm caused by its official. The court in Monroe specitically exempted the mu- 
nicipality from liability for the ads  of its officials. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 187 
(1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews. of New York, 436 U.S. 
658 (1978). 
26. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14, 169 nn.17-18 (1985). 
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at  191. 
28. Id. at 187. 
29. Although states and municipalities were not liable for damages under § 
1983, both could be sued for prospective injunctive relief by suing their officers in 
their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at  167 11.14, 169 nn.17- 
18. 
30. Monroe, 365 U.S. at  188-91; Cushman, supra note 12, at 699. 
31. Monroe, 365 US. at  188-91. 
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Congress' antagonistic reaction to the Sherman Amendment to 
justify not classifying a municipality as a person." 
C. From Monroe to Monell 
The Monroe rule, which limited the liability of a municipal- 
ity, was overturned seventeen years later in Monell v. Depart- 
ment of Social Services of New York City.33 In 1978, the Court 
in Monell held that a municipality could be classified as a per- 
son under section 1983.~  However, the Court limited the 
scope of this liability to official municipality policies that 
"cause" an  employee to violate another's constitutional 
rights.35 In other words, a municipality is not liable for the 
tortious acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat 
superiorS6 unless there is a final decision made by an official 
32. Id. at 191. 
33. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
34. Id. In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social Services and 
the Board of Education of New York City brought a class action suit. Id. at  660- 
61. These women had been forced to take unpaid leaves of absence before such 
leaves were medically necessary. Id. 
35. Id. at  691-92. The Court in Monell clearly limited municipal liability to 
a d s  by its employees that were directed by official policy: 
[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat 
superior theory. 
We begin with the language of 5 1983 as originally passed: 
"[Alny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regu- 
lation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be 
subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileg- 
es, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, 
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage 
of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party 
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro- 
ceeding for redress . . . ." (emphasis added). 
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that, 
under color of some ofiial policy, "causes" an  employee to violate 
. another's constitutional rights. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Many commentators have discussed 
Monnell's impact and scope on public schools. See Cushman, supra note 12; Jeff 
Homer, When Is a School District Liable Under 42 U.S.C. 19832-The Evolution of 
the "Policy or Custom" Requirement, 64 EDUC. L. REP. 339, 340 (1991); Sorenson, 
supra note 3, at  314-16. 
36. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. The Court justified this limitation based on 
Congress' treatment of the Sherman Amendment, which indicates that Congress did 
not desire to impose vicarious liability on the municipality based on the actions of 
a few private citizens. Id. at 691 11.57. However, municipal liability for a d s  of its 
own employees is distinguishable from liability for acts of all private citizens with- 
in a specified jurisdiction. Id. The Court was persuaded that the Sherman Amend- 
ment evidenced an opposition by Congress to vicarious responsibility and a lack of 
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policymaker that causes a municipal employee to violate the 
constitutional rights of anothere3' 
After Monell opened the door for section 1983 suits against 
local municipalities, the question arose whether the state or its 
agencies could be held liable under section 1983 as well. The 
Supreme Court put that question to  rest in Will v. Michigan 
Department of State Police.38 The Court held that neither the 
State nor any of its officials acting in their official capacities 
are persons under section 1983.39 Thus, if a school district is 
classified as an arm of the state, it is not liable for damages 
under section 1983.40 Conversely, if the school district is not 
considered an arm of the state, it is subject to  liability under 
section 1983 if the other prima facie elements of a section 1983 
claim are met? The question of whether the school is an arm 
intent to bind the municipality through its employees. Id. The Court combined 
these two factors to reject the argument that a municipality could be liable under 
$ 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. 
37. Id. at 690-91. See generally Horner, supra note 35 (discussing the role of 
the policy and policymaker to create liability for public schools under $ 1983). 
38. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). In Will, the plaintiff filed a suit in state court against 
the Department of State Police when he was denied a promotion. Id. at 60. The 
plaintiff alleged that he was denied the promotion because his brother had been a 
student activist about whom the department had maintained a "red squad" me. Id. 
39. Id. at 70-71. Will is difficult to understand without the background of the 
Eleventh Amendment. This amendment reserves rights to the states, but Congress 
can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under $ five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 66; Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989). Congress can also abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment under the Commerce Clause. See Pe~sylvania  v. Union 
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens and Scalia, JJ., concurring in that part of the opinion). However, to abro- 
gate Eleventh Amendment state rights, "Congress must make its intention [to abro- 
gate] unmistakably clear." Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Main., 492 U.S. 
96, 101 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); Atascadem State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). The Court has held that Congress did 
not intend to  abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment rights when it passed $ 
1983 because Congress' intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment was not 
clear. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979). Thus, the only way to make a 
state liable is a congressional amendment to $ 1983. 
40. See, e.g., Martinez v. Board of Educ., 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that school districts within the state of New Mexico are an arm of the 
state and therefore not subject to $ 1983); Martinez v. Board of Educ., 724 F. 
Supp. 857 0. Utah 1989) (holding school board is an arm of the state), overruled 
by Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding school 
board is not an arm of the state). 
41. Ambus, 975 F.2d 1555 (holding that school districts within the state of 
Utah are not an arm of the state, and therefore are subject to § 1983). The Tenth 
Circuit has decided cases both ways depending upon its interpretation of state 
laws. Compare Ambus, 975 F.2d at  1555 (holding that a school district is not an 
arm of the state, thus subject to $ 1983 claims) with Martinez, 748 F.2d at 1393 
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of the state, and thus a person under section 1983 is discussed 
below.42 
The elements of section 1983 are set forth in title 42 of the 
United States Code: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the juris- 
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or  
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at  law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress? 
Aside from this sentence, Congress has given little guidance for 
section 1983 civil rights ~ l a i m s . ~  Thus, the meaning of section 
1983 elements have been promulgated by the courts. This pro- 
mulgation has created a complex body of judicial law, which 
augments the importance of understanding each essential ele- 
ment as applied in the educational context. The following four 
elements, extracted from 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, have been the sub- 
ject of most of the litigation in the educational arena: 
A person who 
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus- 
tom, or usage of any State 
who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen or 
other person, 
a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to 
the injured party.45 
Each of these elements is necessary to establishing a prima 
facie case. If the defendant can show that any one of these 
elements is missing, the section 1983 claim will fail. 
(holding that a school district is an arm fo the state, thus not subject to 8 1983 
claims) For the elements of a 8 1983 claim, see i&ra part 11. 
42. See infia part IIA. 
43. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1988). 
44. See supra part IA. 
45. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1988). 
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A. Who or What Is a Person? 
Three broad classes of persons can be sued under section 
1983: a person in an individual capacity:6 a person in an of& 
cial capacity," and entities, such as a school district."' In 
reality these three classifications are really two, because any- 
time a person is sued in an official capacity, the plaintiff is 
actually suing the entity that person represents. However, the 
courts use all three classifications, so they will be considered 
separately. 
First, any individual sued in an individual capacity is clas- 
sified as a "person7' under section 1983, regardless of whether 
that individual is a state or local offi~ial.~' There is no com- 
plex formula for finding that an individual is a "person" under 
section 1983. 
Second, if a person is sued in an official capacity, the clas- 
sification as a "person" depends upon whether the official is a 
state official. A state official cannot be sued for damages in an 
official capacity because it would be the same as suing the 
state. Under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police:' 
the state is not a "person" and cannot be sued for damages 
under section 1983. An injured party is limited to seeking pro- 
spective injunctive relief from the state and monetary relief 
ancillary to injunctive relief.51 Conversely, if a municipal (not 
state) employee is sued in an official capacity, it is the munici- 
pality that is actually being sued and is liable for general dam- 
ages under M0ne11.~~ This is because a municipality does not 
receive protection under the Eleventh A~nendment.~~ 
Third, municipal liability and state non-liability under 
section 1983 is particularly important to entities like schools 
and school districts. Schools can be arms either of the state or 
46. This could be a teacher, a principal, a school employee, or a school board 
member. 
47. Suing a person in his official capacity is the same as suing the govern- 
ment agency that he represents. Thus, if a principal is sued in his or her official 
capacity, i t  is the same as naming the school district as a defendant. 
48. See, e.g., Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992). 
49. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part by 
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This person is rarely the 
focus of a $ 1983 claim because usually she does not have deep pockets. 
50. 491 US. 58, 68-69 (1989). 
51. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 US. 159, 167 11.14, 169 ~ . 1 7 - 1 8  (1985). 
52. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Will, 
491 U.S. at 68-69. 
53. See Monell, 436 US. at 690 n.54. 
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of municipaIities depending upon the court's interpretation of 
the specific state law.54 If the school is held to be an arm of 
the state, the analysis stops there, and the school is protected 
from section 1983 liability under the Eleventh Amend~nent.~~ 
However, most schools are not classified as arms of the state 
and are therefore subject to  damages under section 1983 as 
persons.56 
B. How Extensive is the Term "Under Color of law?" 
The term "under color of law" had a limited reach in the 
early section 1983 cases.57 Traditionally, only acts committed 
by state officers in performance of their official duties came 
54. Compare Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that a school is not an arm of the state) with Martinez v. Board of Educ., 
748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that a school is an arm of the state). Most 
cases have found that school districts are persons. To reach this conclusion, a court 
focuses on how much control the state has over the school districts. For example, 
New Mexico's Constitution provides the state with significant management control 
over schools. See Ambus, 975 F.2d at 1561-62. In contrast, Utah's local school dis- 
tricts have more control-at least according to  the court--so they are ostensibly not 
an arm of the state. 
Most jurisdictions have held that a school district is not an arm of the state. 
In such jurisdictions, the schools are potentially liable under $ 1983. This liability 
was derived from the analysis in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Educa- 
tion v. Doyle, which denied a school district Eleventh Amendment immunity since 
it was not an arm of the state. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Although Mt. Healthy was an 
Eleventh Amendment immunity case-not a 5 1983 case-its analysis has been 
applied to school districts in the post-Monell era. Most courts have found that 
school districts are not arms of the state and thus potentially liable under $ 1983. 
See, e.g., Ambus, 975 F.2d 1555 (holding a school district was not an arm of the 
state in Utah); Rosa R. v. Comelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a 
school district was not an arm of the state in Co~ecticut), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 
941 (1990); Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(holding a school district was not an arm of the state in New York); Minton v. 
Saint Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a school 
district was not an arm of the state in Louisiana); Travelers Indem. Co. v. School 
Bd. of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding a school district was 
not an arm of the state in Florida), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982). But see Mar- 
tinez v. Board of Educ. of Taos Mun. Sch. Dist., 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that the New Mexico schools are an arm of the state). 
55. The idea of the Eleventh Amendment is that citizens cannot bring suit 
against their own state in federal court unless Congress specifically disallowed 
Eleventh Amendment protection, which it did not do for 5 1983. See Will v. Michi- 
gan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989). 
Whether a particular entity is a municipality or an arm of the state is a ques- 
tion infrequently discussed in $ 1983 literature because it rarely arises outside the 
school district context. 
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
57. Eric H. Zagrans, 'Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of 
Section 1983 LiabiZity, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 499-500 (1985). 
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within the scope of section 1983." However, Monroe v. Pape 
rejected this narrow construction of "under color of law."5g 
Monroe expanded the interpretation to include not only acts 
under legitimate law, but also the "[m]isuse of power, possessed 
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action 
taken 'under color of' state law.'60 
Although scholars currently debate the expanded view held 
in Monroe:' the expanded view is the current status of the 
law. Thus, individuals and entities such as school districts, 
which are not arms of the state, can be held liable for misuse of 
power. For example, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dis- 
triCt,'j2 a school teacher had consensual sexual relations with a 
minor. Such conduct was not sanctioned by the school and 
contravened the state's statutory rape law. However, the teach- 
er took full advantage of his position as teacher and coach to 
seduce the student, and thus he acted under color of law.63 
58. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961), overruled in part by Monell 
v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 US. 658 (1978). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also 
Susan B.  Shoemaker, D.T. v. Independent School Distrid: Limiting Liability Under 
42 U.S.C. $ 1983, 24 URB. L. 393, 393-94 (1992) (discussing "under color of law" as 
developed in various supreme court cases including United States v. Classic). 
61. Compare Zagrans, supra note 57 with Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of 
"Under Color Of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992). 
Zagrans argues that § 1983 should be limited to state-authorized deprivation. 
Zagrans, supra note 57, at 589. Such a limitation more accurately reflects the 
"intent and understanding of the enacting Congress." Id. Further, this approach 
would be simpler and eliminate the need for judicially created makeshift rules to 
fill in gaps. Id. Finally, the limitation should relieve the Court's impulse to "pare 
away substantive constitutional rights as a means of limiting the statute's broad 
scope." Id. 
Winter rejects the Zagrans model and interpretation both historically and as a 
matter of statutory construction. Winter, supra at  325-27. Winter claims that when 
an ador is clothed with the appearance of official authority, the ador carries more 
weight and can consequently do more harm. Id. at 417-18. For example, if a police 
officer accuses a person of shoplifting, the accusation carries more weight than a 
similar accusation by a private citizen. Id. Winter's approach is best characterized 
by the following quote from William Penn: "Every Oppression against Law, by 
Colour of any usurped Authority, is a Kind of Destruction, and it is the worst 
Oppression that is done by Colour of Justice." Id. at 418 (quoting 1 A COLLECTION 
OF THE WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 27 (1726)). 
62. 15 F.3d 443, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). 
63. Id. at 452 n.4. The court listed some of the factors that showed the 
teacher acted "under color of" state law. He required Doe to do little or no home- 
work. Id. He spoke to another teacher about raising Doe's grades. The teacher was 
also Doe's basketball coach. Id. His first inappropriate physical contact commenced 
after a basketball game. Id. The teacher used his access to school facilities such as 
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Thus, the "under color of law" requirement was met when a 
teacher acted by virtue of his position and not his actual au- 
thority. 
However, not all acts by teachers are under color of state 
law. In D.T. v. Independent School District No. 16,64 a f&h- 
grade teacher and boys' basketball coach sexually molested 
some of his players while they were raising money to attend a 
summer basketball camp. The court held that the camp and 
fundraising were not school programs, but voluntary communi- 
ty  a~t ivi t ies .~~ Since the teacher was apparently acting outside 
his official role as teacher and coach in running the summer 
activity, he did not act "under color of law." 
Although the court in Doe focused on the differences be- 
tween Doe and D.T.,B6 analyzing the similarity of the courts' 
approaches helps to  better understand the phrase "under color 
of law" in the school context. Both courts focused on whether 
the teacherlcoach was able t o  take advantage of these children 
because of his teacher status." The question of teacher status 
in the "under color of law" context is fact specific. For example, 
D.T. would likely have come out the other way if the teacher 
had molested the students on the school grounds or after a 
school-sponsored activity. 
Although the teacher-student relationship discussed above 
is a commonly litigated area for the phrase "under color of 
law," there are many other areas in which school districts, 
administrators, or teachers may be held liable under section 
1983. Other commonly litigated areas under section 1983 in- 
clude wrongful dismissals68 (conflicts between employees and 
a lab room adjoining his classroom and the fieldhouse to engage in inappropriate 
sexual contact with Doe. Id. These factors illustrate how the teacherlcoach took 
advantage of his position t o  seduce Doe. 
64. 894 F.2d 1176, 1182-85 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990). 
Three players and the coach traveled to Sands Springs and Tulsa, Oklahoma, to 
sell candy in order to raise money for summer camp. Id. at 1183. The coach had 
the parents' permission to travel to these locations and spend one night. Id. at  
1184. During this trip, the coach sexually abused each of the players. Id. 
65. Id. at 1186-92; see also Doe, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4 (noting factual dserences 
between Doe and D.T.). 
66. Doe, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4 (noting factual differences between Doe and D.T.). 
67. See D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1186-92 (10th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 
F.3d at 451-54, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). 
68. See, e.g., Maestas v. Board of Educ. of Mora Indep. Sch. Dist., 749 F.2d 
591 (10th Cir. 1984) (former assistant superintendent and former district bookkeep- 
er brought suit under 8 1983 for failure to rehire when they did not make contri- 
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the administration or school board), limitations on free expres- 
sion (conflicts between students or employees and the adminis- 
tration or school board):' and student discipline (conflicts be- 
tween students and the admini~tration).'~ 
In the peer abuse context, "under color of law" is a much 
more difficult issue. The actual deprivation is caused by a 
peer-a private third party-not the school or one of its em- 
ployees. The injured party must argue that the school created 
the hostile environment and refused to  try to stop the abuse 
after it was reported. This indirect link to the school causes one 
to wonder where the threshold for causation lies. 
C. What is the Threshold for Causation under Section 1983.2 
In City of Canton v. Harris,'l the Court reiterated the im- 
portance of causation in section 1983 claims. The Court held 
that the "first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability 
under [section] 1983 is the question whether there is a direct 
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the al- 
leged constitutional deprivati~n."'~ In the case of peer violence 
at school, this may be difficult to show since the deprivation is 
caused by a party other than the school or one of its officials. 
To compound this causation problem, the Supreme Court has 
butions to the school board chairman's campaign); Martinez v. Board of Educ. of 
Taos Mun. Sch. Dist., 748 F.2d 1393, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984) (former superintendent 
brought suit for wrongful termination under $ 1983 claiming he was terminated 
"because of his 'real or imagined' activities in [a] school board election"); Blackburn 
v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 749 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (teacher brought $ 
1983 action claiming wrongful dismissal when she exercised her First Amendment 
rights); Martinez v. Board of Educ., 724 F. Supp. 857 (D. Utah 1989) (former high 
school coach brought a $ 1983 action claiming she was wrongfully terminated as 
an assistant basketball and volleyball coach). 
69. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (stu- 
dent claimed under $ 1983 that his right to free expression was denied when the 
student was disciplined for using a sexual metaphor during an assembly); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students claimed 
under 4 1983 that their right to free expression was denied when the school dis- 
trict would not permit them to wear black arm bands protesting the Vietnam war). 
70. See, e.g., Bethel, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (student claimed right to free ex- 
pression was denied under $ 1983 when the student was disciplined for using a 
sexual metaphor during an assembly); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (student claimed teacher violated his rights under $ 1983 
when the teacher lashed the second-grade student to a chair for the better part of 
two days). 
71. 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989). 
72. Id. at 385. 
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held that the government has no affirmative duty to protect its 
citizens from private actors.73 
While these obstacles are difficult, they are not insur- 
mountable. Such obstacles may be overcome by showing a spe- 
cial relationship and deliberate indifferen~e.~~ Some commen- 
tators argue that the vulnerability of the student and mandato- 
ry attendance laws create a special relationship between the 
school and its students.75 Possible bases for special relation- 
ships will be further discussed in part 111. 
In addition to having a special relationship with a student, 
the school must also act with deliberate indifference that de- 
prives a student of some federal right.76 For example, inade- 
quately training teachers could be a policy of deliberate indif- 
ference if the inadequacy was so obvious that it would likely 
lead to  constitutional deprivations in the classroom.77 Thus, 
the school's action or inaction ultimately leads to a student's 
deprivation, and not just any deprivation, but a deprivation of 
a federal or constitutional right. 
D. What Constitutes a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right? 
Section 1983 cannot be claimed for a general injury; section 
1983 is limited to deprivations of federal or constitutional 
rights. For example, in the teacher disciplinary context, a right 
would probably arise under the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
deprivation of either a liberty interest7' or a property inter- 
e ~ t . ? ~  In the case of physical injuries caused by another stu- 
dent, a student would probably claim a violation of bodily in- 
tegrity.'' It is important for the claimant to distinguish be- 
73. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 US. 189, 191 
(1989). 
74. Adam M. Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun Cause Help Ain't Comin': 
The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 588, 615-18 (1993) (citing Leslie Ansely, Many Teens Feel Unsafe in School, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1993, a t  1A). 
75. Id. at 601-14. 
76. See City of Canton, 489 US. at  388. 
77. See id. For an example of conduct that constitutes deliberate inMerence, 
see Doe v. Taylor Idep.  Sch. Dkt., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding to see 
if the principal's failure to take corrective action against a teacher rose to the level 
of deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). 
78. The liberty interest can take the form of a violation of the teacher's First 
Amendment rights to speech or harm to the teacher's reputation. 
79. If the dismissed teacher had an expectation of continued employment, the 
dismissal deprives the teacher of a property interest. See, e.g., Ambus v. Granite 
Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992). 
80. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450-52 (5th Cir. 
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tween claiming tortious conduct and constitutional or federal 
depri~ation;~' if the claimant fails to structure the claim as a 
federal or constitutional deprivation, the case will be dis- 
111. A SCHOOL'S IJABILITY FOR PEER ABUSE UNDER 
SECTION 1983 
Public schools have become a place where violence and 
sexual harassment are ~ornmonplace.~~ In a recent poll, one 
third of the students polled felt unsafe at school." Most stu- 
dents knew someone who had brought a weapon t o  school.85 
Fifty percent said they knew someone who had switched 
schools to  feel safer? Sexual harassment is commonplace. 
Eighty-five percent of girls and seventy-six percent of boys in a 
AAUW survey reported "unwanted and unwelcome sexual be- 
havior [at school] that interferes with their lives."87 With all 
1994) (although it was a teacher, not a student, that violated Doe's bodily integri- 
ty, the court's analysis substantiates bodily integrity claims under 8 1983), cert. de- 
nied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). In a recent Supreme Court opinion regarding 8 1983, 
the Court in dicta recognized bodily integrity as a substantive due process right. 
See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., joined by 
07Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ.). 
81. Both torts and constitutional deprivations can arise h m  the same set of 
facts. 
82. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-22 @. Utah 1994). 
83. Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 992-93 (10th 
Cir. 1994). 
84. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 589. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Karen M. Davis, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a 
Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND. L.J. 1123, 
1124 (citing THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERS~IY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL 
FOUNDATION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN 
AMI?,RICA7S SCHOOLS 7 (June 1993)). 
Sexual harassment may not be actionable under 8 1983. Section 1983 requires 
a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right. Verbal sexual harassment, though 
offensive, may not qualify under 8 1983. Scholars are calling for sexual harassment 
claims in schools to be actionable under Title IX, which "was intended to discour- 
age discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs." Monica L. Sherer, 
Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: S c h d  Liability Under Title LX for Peer 
S d  Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2123 (1993); cf. Gail Sorenson, Peer 
Sexual Hamssment: Remedies and Guidelines Under Fedeml Law, 92 ED. LAW REP. 
1, 1-5 (1994). "Because judicial actions under section 1983 are extremely complex 
and because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend liability under Sec- 
tion 1983, students have had remarkably little success with such claims." Id. at  8 
(citing as examples DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 
189 (1989) (imposing no afbmative constitutional duty to protect individuals from 
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these problems, some people have sought relief under section 
1983. However, the courts have- been reluctant to  use section 
1983 as a means for remedying the problems in our public 
One reason for this reluctance comes from the Su- 
preme Court, which held in DeShaney that the state has no 
af'firmative duty to protect individuals from private actors. 
A. The Court's Analysis in DeShaney 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded 
that "[tlhe facts of [DeShaney u. Winnebago] are undeniably 
tragic."89 Joshua DeShaney was living with his father, whose 
second marriage had just recently ended in divorce.90 The sec- 
ond wife of Joshua's father complained to  police at the time of 
their divorce that Joshua was being ab~sed.~ '  The Winnebago 
County Department of Social Services (DSS) interviewed the 
father, but he denied the  accusation^.^^ Later, Joshua was ad- 
mitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abra- 
s i o n ~ . ~ ~  The examining physician suspected child abuse and 
notified DSS. A "Child Protection Team" reviewed Joshua's 
case but found there was insufficient evidence to remove Josh- 
ua from his father's custody?4 The team did, however, take 
several other actions to protect Joshua. His father had to  at- 
tend counseling and Joshua had to attend a preschool pro- 
In November 1983, a month later, Joshua was again 
treated for suspicious injuries.g6 For the next few months a 
private actors) and Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(finding "no constitutiona1 duty to protect mentally retarded boy from assault and 
rape by peer with history of assaultive behavior; school attendance does not create 
special custodial relationship")). However, if the sexual harassment includes physi- 
cal touching, the student may be able to bring an action under 9 1983. See, e.g., 
Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a "special relationship 
existing between student and state imposed duty on state to protect [the] student 
from sexual assault by [a] classmate"). 
88. See, e.g., cases cited infizc note 116. But see Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. 
Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
89. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sews., 489 U.S. 189, 191 
(1989). 
90. Id. 
91. The second wife was not Joshua's natural mother. Id. at 192. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. The "Child Protection Team" consisted of a pediatrician, a child psycholo- 
gist, a police detective, the county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers, and various 
hospital personnel. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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caseworker visited Joshua monthly; she carefully recorded that 
Joshua was not in preschool and had suspicious physical inju- 
ries?? On two occasions, the caseworker was not allowed to  
see Joshua because he was "too ill."98 Sadly, in March 1984, 
Joshua's father beat him so severely that he suffered perma- 
nent brain damage and will likely live the rest of his life insti- 
tu t ional i~ed.~~ Joshua's father was convicted of child 
abuse. loo 
Joshua's natural mother brought a section 1983 claim 
against DSS and various individual employees for depriving 
Joshua of his liberty interest under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'" Joshua's mother claimed his liberty interest 
was deprived because DSS failed t o  intervene and protect him 
when they knew of the danger he was ido2 The district court 
granted DSS's motion for summary judgment, which the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court af- 
firmed. lo' 
The Supreme Court found "no affirmative right t o  govern- 
mental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself 
may not deprive the individual."'" The purpose of the Four- 
teenth Amendment was to  protect individuals from the state, 
not from each other.lo5 The Amendment was phrased as a 
limitation on the state's power to  act, "not as a guarantee of 
certain minimal levels of safety and security."106 
The Court's underlying policy consideration was twofold. 
First, the Court recognized that if DSS had acted too soon, it 
would likely have been attacked by Joshua's father under the 
Due Process ~ 1 a u s e . l ~ ~  Second, the state, through its legisla- 
tive process, should decide which system of liability is best to  
place upon the state and its offi~ers.''~ If the state wants 
DSS to be liable, the state can create such a system under tort 
97. Id. at 192-93. 
98. Id. at 193. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 193-94. 
104. Id. at 196. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 195. 
107. Id. at 203. 
108. Id. 
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law through its normal legislative process.109 "They should 
not have [such liability] thrust upon them by this Court's ex- 
pansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment."' lo 
However, the Court did recognize two exceptions to its 
holding of no afliirmative duty. First, the state creates a special 
relationship for itself when a person is incarcerated or institu- 
tionalized.'" Such individuals have been committed involun- 
tarily and-by reason of their liberty deprivation-are unable 
to care for themselves.'" Second, the court implied in foot- 
note nine that an  affirmative duty to protect may arise in "a 
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institution- 
ali~ation."~'~ For example, if the state puts a child "in a foster 
home operated by the state's agent," the state might be liable if 
the foster home is worse than the home from which the child 
was removed."' However, since these facts were not before 
the Court, this exception is dicta only.115 
B. Applying DeShaney to the Public School Context 
Although DeShaney was a child welfare case, the opinion's 
rules and exceptions have become the source of controversy in 
the public school context. Courts have been reluctant to extend 
the special relationship doctrine to public schools. The six cir- 
cuits that have addressed the issue have held that schools have 
no special relationship with their  student^.'^^ However, many 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at  198-199 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 492 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 201 n.9. 
114. Id. This situation is often referred to as the "snake-pit" exception because 
the state action created a worse environment for the child. See Karen M. Blum, 
DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435 
(1994); Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for 
Indirect Harm, 62 CIN. L. REV. 883 (1994). 
115. DeSbney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
116. See, e.g., Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 
1994) (holding the school had no ailinnative duty under § 1983 to protect a stu- 
dent injured by another student in the school parking lot after a nonmandatory 
school dance); Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 992-93 (10th Cir. 
1994) (holding no custodial relationship exists between school and student; thus, 
the school district did not have an affirmative duty to protect students from anoth- 
er student even if school employees had received warnings that the other student 
had threatened violence); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (no custodial relationship); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 
254 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
commentators are persuaded that the special relationship doc- 
trine should extend to  public schools.117 Both sides have valid 
arguments to support their position on the special relationship 
issue. 
1. The case for finding a special relationship in pub1 ic schools 
a. Arguments from the courts in favor of a special rela- 
tionship. Less than four months after DeShaney was decided, 
Pagano v. Massapequa extended the special relationship doc- 
trine to public s~hools."~ The analysis in Pagano is very lim- 
ited. The court based its opinion on the frequency of the 
abuse.llg According to  the court, a single act of negligence 
does not form a basis for a civil rights action.120 However, the 
707, 713-14 (3rd Cir. 1993) (no custodial relationship); J.O. v. Alton Community 
Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990); Russell v. Fannin County 
Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-83 (N.D. Ga. 1992), a r d  without opinion, 981 
F.2d 1263 (l l th Cir. 1992); cf. Michael Gilbert, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle 
Ground on the Question of Mzrmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 471, 481 11.45 (1993) (listing other cases holding no custodial relationship). 
But see Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); cf. 
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (custodial relationship 
undecided), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 
1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (this 
final decision never discussed the special or custodial relationship theory, but de- 
cided the issue on the basis of the principal's "deliberate indifference" to the con- 
dud of the teacher, a state actor, who caused the deprivation), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 70 (1994); Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a special 
relationship existed between a deaf student and the superintendent); Spivey v. 
Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 ( l l th  Cir. 1994) (the court distinguishes this case from Rus- 
sell v. Fannin County School District and many of the other cases above because 
the student was a residential student and could not go home at the end of the 
day). 
117. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 74, at 623-24; Steven F. Huefner, M r -  
mative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1972 
(1990); Blum, supra note 114, at 479; see also Gilbert, supra note 116, at  509 
(arguing for the proposition that an affirmative duty should be applied in some 
contexts but not all). But see Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney: 
Special Relationships, Schools & the Fifih Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97 (1993) (argu- 
ing against affirmative obligation to protect students in public schools). 
118. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Like 
most other # 1983 claims in the public school cases, the issue arises in the context 
of a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g 
granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 
15 F.3d 443, 458 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Searnons v. 
Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D. Utah 1994) (motion to dismiss). 
119. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 642-43. 
120. Id. at  643. This is not exactly accurate. A single act of negligence may 
rise to the level of deliberate indifference if the plaintiff can show that the single 
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student in this case alleged seventeen separate incidents of 
verbal and physical abuse.lzl The court held that allowing 
seventeen acts could amount to  deliberate indifference on the 
part of the 
Pagano and cases decided by other district courts in the 
Second Circuit are the only cases to find a special relationship 
between public schools and their students. The Court of Ap- 
peals for the Second Circuit has not yet opined on the issue. 
Although it was thought that the Fifth Circuit had split with 
the other circuit courts by finding a special relationship be- 
tween schools and students, that assumption was subsequently 
denied by the Fifth Circuit.lB To date, no circuit court has 
act was a policy made by either a legislative body (school board) or a person with 
final decision-making authority (principal or superintendent). This would probably 
be a rare event requiring, for example, a school board to pass a motion allowing 
guns at show and tell. 
121. Id. at 643. 
122. Id. 
123. Compare Gilbert, supra note 116, at 489-93 with Leffall v. Dallas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1994). The thought at  the time of the 
Gilbert comment was that the Fif'th Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted the 
Pagano approach in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District. Gilbert, supra note 
116, at 489 n.90 (citing Doe v. Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, (5th Cir. 1993)). Subsequent to 
the Gilbert comment, the Fifth Circuit opined on the rehearing of Doe v. Taylor 
Independent School District. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). The court avoided the special rela- 
tionship issue and denied the principal's motion for summary judgment under the 
deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 458; cf. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 528-29 ('We did 
not address the question of whether a special relationship exists in an ordinary 
public school setting in our en banc decision in Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist."). 
L.effall clarified that Doe v. Taylor Independent School District did not address 
the special relationship issue. However, Leffall did not conclusively establish the 
Fifth Circuit's position on special relationships. The court held that there was no 
special relationship with a student who was killed by random gunfire in a parking 
lot after a school dance. Id. at 526-29. The court buttressed its holding by citing 
that its "sister circuits" had concluded that no special relationship existed between 
a school and a student. Id. at 528 (citing the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits). However, the court left the door open for the possibility of a special 
relationship being established in the future. The court focused its fmding of no 
special relationship on the student's attendance at a voluntary after-school dance 
as opposed to the regular school day attendance. Id. at 529. Because the student 
was not compelled to go to the dance, the court stated: 
Id. 
W]e need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and conclude 
that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public 
school district and its students; we conclude only that no such relation- 
ship exists during a school-sponsored dance held outside of the time dur- 
ing which students are required to attend school for non-voluntary activi- 
ties. 
Thus, the position of the Fifth Circuit is simply uncertain at this time. 
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found a special relationship in public schools.'24 
b. Arguments from commentators in favor of a special 
relationship. Most commentators argue that students should be 
able to bring section 1983 actions for deprivations caused by 
other students.'" Although the general rule is that the gov- 
ernment has no affirmative duty to  protect students from their 
peers, commentators argue that schools should fall into the 
special relationship exception under DeSh~ney.'~~ This argu- 
ment is based on three theories: legal custody theory, 
functional custody theory, and the snake-pit theory. 
Under the legal custody theory, the government has a duty 
to protect students under the doctrine of in loco parentis. This 
authority is not voluntarily given by parents but is mandated 
by state statute." States mandate this authority through 
compulsory education laws and punitive actions against both 
parents and students for truancy.'28 Thus, the laws mandate 
that a school take custody of a student during the regular 
school day. Because a school effectively has legal custody dur- 
ing the regular school day, it should also assume the respon- 
sibility associated with its custody. 
Even if a school does not have legal custody, commentators 
argue that a school has functional custody of a student, which 
is an indicia of a special relati~nship.''~ Rather than looking 
at the school's legal authority, the functional custody theory 
looks at the particular set of circumstances to find a special 
relationship, creating an affirmative duty.'" The focus is on 
factors such as control, dependency, and vulnerability.'3' 
"Schools may be said to  have functional custody of students 
because they restrict students' ability to  protect themselves as 
well as their parents' ability to intercede on their behalf."'" 
124. Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994); see cases cited supra 
note 116 and accompanying text. 
125. See commentators cited supra note 117. 
126. Id. 
127. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (1994) (requiring students to 
attend school); see also Greenfield, supra note 74, at 604-05. 
128. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-103 (1994) (empowering local board's 
to issue truancy citations and enforce school attendance). 
129. See Blum, supra note 114, at 445-57; Greenfield, supra note 74, at 609- 
14; Huefner, supra note 117, at 1966-69. 
130. Compare Blum, supra note 114, at 445-57 with Greenfield, supra note 74, 
at  609-14 and Huefner, supra note 117, at 1966-69. 
131. Greenfield, supra note 74, at  609; Hueher, supra note 117, at  1957. 
132. Greenfield, supra note 74, at  609. 
2371 PEER ABUSE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 257 
In finding a special relationship under functional custody, 
courts should look to the nature of the student-state 
relationship? Liability should arise in the school context be- 
cause the state, by limiting a victim's freedom or taking some 
responsibility for his or her care, has increased the victim's 
dependence on the state's protection? This increased depen- 
dence creates an aflirmative duty for the school. 
The snake-pit theory, which stems from DeShaney's foot- 
note nine,'% is another theory used to create a special rela- 
tionship. Under this theory, if a student is placed in a more 
dangerous situation by the state, the state assumes an affirma- 
tive duty and should be liable for any increase in harm.ls6 
The affirmative duty arises because the state creates and con- 
trols the environment where the student is harmed.13' How- 
ever, this theory leaves many policy questions unanswered. For 
example, was the child worse off at  school than he or she would 
have been playing in the neighborhood at home? A child who is 
shot at school may have been less likely to  be shot at school 
than in the neighborhood playground. How do we gauge 
whether a child is worse off? If a student in Burlington, Wyo- 
ming, is less likely t o  be shot at home, while a student in East 
Los Angeles is more likely to be shot at home, does an equal 
protection problem arise if one student can recover damages 
while the other cannot? 
c. Underlying policy reasons in favor of a special relation- 
ship. The policy reasons for creating a special relationship 
between students and schools are apparent in both academic 
discussion and the cases. Students who are physically or sexu- 
ally assaulted at school have no recourse against the estab- 
lishment that may have permitted or even fostered the environ- 
ment that gave rise to  the deprivation. Granted, the injured 
party has a right against the tortfeasor, but this does little to 
remedy an environment that threatens future deprivations. 
133. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1957. 
134. Id. 
135. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 
n.9 (1989). 
136. Id. 
137. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1968. In DeSltaney, the abusive environment 
was created by Joshua's father, not the government agency. However, if the agency 
had taken Joshua out of his father's home and put him in a foster home that was 
an even worse environment, the agency would be liable for the increased risk of 
harm. See DeShuney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. 
258 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
Additionally, it is unlikely that the state will provide a 
cause of action for the injured party under state tort law? 
Public perception, whether accurate or not, is that expanding 
school liability will increase the cost of schools. Schools will ei- 
ther have to raise revenues or cut programs. Either move will 
likely be controversial and unpopular. 
Furthermore, historically this is precisely the type of harm 
that section 1983 was intended to  prevent-a deprivation of 
federal rights due to local officials' reluctance or inability t o  
enforce the law.lsg If the state is reluctant or unable, it is the 
federal government's duty to step in and protect such constitu- 
tional and federal rights. 
Finally, in contrast to  public perception, creating a special 
relationship will not produce a myriad of large civil awards 
against the schools.140 A special relationship simply helps the 
injured party satisfy the "under color of law" prong. Causation 
still must be established by proving that the school official or 
district was deliberately indifferent.141 This standard is high- 
er than simple negligence and places a heavy burden on the in- 
jured student.142 Such a standard would limit successful sec- 
tion 1983 claims to only the most egregious cases. 
138. In Utah, for example, the Governmental Immunity A d  prevents an in- 
jured party from suing the school district for any injury arising out of an assault 
or battery. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30-10 (1993). The exception to this is if the 
school district or its officers acted with fraud or malice. UTAH CODE ANN. 5 63-30- 
4 (1993). However, this is no help for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that a 
school official or board will have acted with malice towards a student injured by 
another student. Their conduct will likely be categorized as negligent or grossly 
negligent, which does not rise to the level of malice. Second, even if a teacher 
intentionally injured or caused a student to be injured, the school district still may 
not be liable. Such conduct by a teacher would likely be outside the scope of em- 
ployment and, thus, the school district may not be liable. 
139. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled in part by 
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But, there may be a differ- 
ence between the constitutional right sought to be upheld-most likely violation of 
bodily integrity-and assault and battery, which is covered under traditional state 
tort law. A question arises as to whether the courts want to effectively override 
state governmental immunity statutes or whether such decisions should be left to 
legislative bodies. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. 
140. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1961-62; Susanna M. Kim, Comment, Section 
1983 Liability in the Public Schools After Deshaney: The "Special Relationship" Be- 
tureen School and Student, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1136 (1994). 
141. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Greenfield, supra note 
74, at 614-23. 
142. I t  would be interesting to compare the malice standard under the govern- 
mental immunity laws with the deliberate indifference standard under § 1983. 
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In summary, there are strong public policy reasons to  sup- 
port finding a special relationship in public schools. However, 
these policy reasons must be weighed against and compared to 
other policy reasons that support finding no special relation- 
ship as discussed be10w.l~~ 
2. The case against finding a special relationship in public 
schools 
a. The circuit courts have unanimously held no special 
relationship in pu bl ie schools. Presently, six circuit courts of 
appeal have faced the special relationship issue and all six 
have found that no special relationship exists in the public 
school ~0ntex t . l~~  The facts of each case are different and 
each holding varies. To understand why no special relationship 
has been found, it will be useN to compare the extreme 
opinions and the commonalities of these cases. 
The two cases that sit at  opposite extremes are Graham v. 
Independent School District No. I-89l" and Leffall v. Dallas 
Independent School Distr i~t . '~~ In Graham, two students were 
killed by peers on the school  premise^.'^' The decedents' 
mothers each brought section 1983 claims, arguing that the 
school knew of the violent propensities of the aggressor stu- 
dent.14' Furthermore, the school's knowledge combined with 
the quasi-custodial nature of school attend-ance satisfied the 
DeShaney requirements.'" However, the court held that 
"foreseeability cannot create an finnative duty to protect 
when plaintiff remains unable to allege a custodial relation- 
ship."150 The court went on to explain that "[ilnaction by the 
state in the face of a known danger is not enough to  trigger the 
obligation; according t o  DeShaney the state must have limited 
in some way the liberty of a citizen to act on his own be- 
143. Most commentators have taken the position that a special relationship 
should be found. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 74; Huefner, supra note 117. In 
taking such a position, very little attention has been given to the policy reasons 
supporting those decisions not finding special relationships. 
144. See cases cited supra note 116. 
145. 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994). 
146. 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994). 
147. Graham, 22 F.3d at 993 (one student was shot and another was 
stabbed-each mother brought suit). Both cases were dismissed when the court 
granted the school's federal rule 126x6) motions. Id. 
148. Id. at 994. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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half."15' This holding is the strongest position taken by any 
circuit court against fmding an affirmative duty. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the most lenient circuit 
on the peer abuse issue was the Fifth Circuit in Leffall u. Dal- 
las Independent School District? This case is factually dis- 
tinguishable from Graham because the student's death took 
place .after a school dance where attendance was not 
required? Although factually distinguishable from Graham, 
the Leffall opinion indicates that the court was unwilling to  go 
as far as the Tenth Circuit in Graham.155 Leffall went on to 
say that the special relationship decision in "ordinary public 
school" was left open for another day.'= The court hinted 
that under the right factual circumstances, it might fmd a 
special relationship. This somewhat indecisive Fifth Circuit 
opinion represents the weakest stand against fmding a special 
relationship. 
In addition to the extreme positions of the circuits, it is 
important to  focus on the commonalities that have lead the 
courts to their holdings. For example, in opining on the special 
relationship exception to a lack of an affirmative duty, the 
circuits have distinguished schools from the classic incarcera- 
tion or institutionalization scenarios of the DeShaney exception. 
First, the school's custody does not deprive guardians of their 
responsibility over the ~hildren.'~' Guardians are still the pri- 
mary care providers for children.'" Children are only at  
151. Id. at 995 (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 389 (1993)). 
152. However, even the Tenth Circuit seems to  recognize the snake-pit excep- 
tion. See Graham, 22 F.3d at 995 ("[Pllaintiffs cannot point to any affirmative ac- 
tions by the defendants that created or increased the danger to the victims.") (em- 
phasis added). 
153. 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994). 
154. Id. at 529. If a special relationship exists because students are legally 
compelled to attend school, the legal custody argument may fail if attendance is 
voluntary. See supra part 1II.B.l.b. 
155. After noting that the Tenth Circuit "has gone so far as to hold that a 
school district c a ~ o t  be liable for a tort inflicted on a student by a private actor 
during school hours even if its employees knew that the private actor had threat- 
ened the student and was present on school grounds," the Leffall court stated that 
they "need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and conclude that no 
special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public school district and 
its students." Id. at 528-29 (emphasis added). 
156. Id. at 528-29. 
157. E.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); 
J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990). 
158. Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732; J.O. u. Alton, 909 F.2d at 272-73. 
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school for part of the day; the greater part of the day, they are 
not in the custody of the school. Additionally, the courts have 
narrowly read the special relationship exception: 
[Wlhen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so 
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to 
care for himself, and a t  the same time fails to provide for his 
basic human needs--e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, 
and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits 
on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
Process C 1 a ~ s e . l ~ ~  
Since the guardians of a public school student are still the 
primary providers of food, clothing, and shelter, no affirmative 
duty is assumed by the school.160 
Second, students are not as severely restricted as involun- 
tarily committed mental patients or prisoners.16' Although 
there are some school restrictions and a mandatory attendance 
policy, students are not so controlled that they are denied ac- 
cess to help.lB2 Furthermore, parents may choose whether a 
child's education will take place in public schools rather than in 
the home, vocational-technical schools, or private schools.163 
Even if guardians are limited financially, they still retain dis- 
cretion to  withdraw their children.lg4 
Besides the limited restrictions on the students and the 
parents being the primary care providers, little else is used to  
justify the courts' position. Although there is some fluctuation 
in the stricture of holdings of no special relationship, the unan- 
159. Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3rd Cir. 1993) 
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 
(1989)). 
160. J.O. v. Nton, 909 F.2d at 272. 
161. Id. ("The analogy of a school yard to a prison may be a popular one for 
school-age children, but we c a ~ o t  recognize constitutional duties on a child's la- 
ment ."). 
162. Black, 985 F.2d at 713; Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 
1576, 1582 W.D. Ga. 1992), afld without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263 ( l l th  Cir. 1992). 
In Russell, the court stated: "The key concept is the exercise of dominion or re- 
straint by the state. The state must somehow significantly limit an individual's 
freedom or impair his ability to a d  on his own before it can be constitutionally 
required to care and provide for that person." Id. at 1582 (quoting Wideman v. 
Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035 ( l l th  Cir. 1987)) (empha- 
sis added). 
163. Black, 985 F.2d at 713. 
164. Id. at 713-14. But see Greenfield, supm note 74, a t  607-08 (exercising this 
right may be limited because of the economic restraints). 
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swered question is whether courts have denied finding a special 
relationship in public schools because it is a simple bright-line 
test, which makes their job easy in a difficult area of the law, 
or because of valid policy reasons. 
b. Underlying policy reasons against a special relation- 
ship. Several policy reasons support the case against finding a 
special relationship. First, legislative bodies should decide 
whether liability should be imposed through the regular law- 
making process.'" If the state does not already have a tort 
system that creates liability in public schools, the people of that 
state can change the system.lB6 However, such a system 
should not be forced upon them by the "Court's expansion of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth A~nendment."'~~ A 
constitutional wrong is significantly different than a tort? 
Second, few people will be helped by creating liability through 
fmding a special relationship. Commentators argue for the 
need for section 1983 claims.16g However, to buffer the con- 
cern over large liabilities, they argue that the high threshold of 
the deliberate indifference standard will allow only egregious 
cases to  go to  trial. However, this reasoning is flawed. If delib- 
erate indifference is such a high standard,'" very few plain- 
tiffs will find relief under section 1983. Conversely, because 
section 1983 also includes awards for attorneys' fees, lawyers 
have a greater incentive to  sue under section 1983. Opening 
the door a little more will encourage many unnecessary suits t o  
burden the already overcrowded federal system. 
Third, damage awards under section 1983 take money 
away from our educational system. Blaming the school rather 
than the student tortfeasors is no solution to violent behavior 
in our schools. Damages simply reduce the already limited 
funds available for public education.17' 
165. See DeShaney v. Wi~ebago  County Dep't of Social Sews., 489 U.S. 189, 
203 (1989). 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing 
De Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1989)). 
169. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 609; Huefner, supra note 117, at  1957. 
170. Hueher, supra note 117, at 1957. 
171. The state created the educational process to satisfy the needs of the com- 
munity. The state through the normal legislative process should also decide what 
level of risk is appropriate in public schools. If corrective action is needed, the 
state can take a variety of creative approaches to resolve the crisis in our schools. 
The court has just one approach--damages, which takes hnds  away from our pub- 
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Fourth, a court's action may force state legislative bodies to 
react in ways that may not be beneficial for education. Al- 
though commentators argue that section 1983 claims will be 
limited, state officials may believe that Pandora's box has been 
opened and overreact. As discussed in part 1I.A. above, the 
state cannot be sued under section 1983. The perceived 
threat-not necessarily the realistic threat-of section 1983 
liability may encourage a more centralized public educational 
system.'72 This does nothing to help the injured parties and 
reduces the flexibility of states to explore helpful alternative 
educational policies. '" 
Fifth, allowing students to  sue the school district for inju- 
ries caused by other students goes beyond Congress's intent in 
enacting section 1983. Congress specifically rejected the 
Sherman Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.'~~ The 
Sherman Amendment, which would have made municipalities 
liable for any act committed within their boundaries, was re- 
jected because of the tremendous burden that it would place on 
m~nicipalities.'~~ Although Monell allowed municipal liabili- 
ty, it limited that liability to situations where an official policy 
causes an  employee to violate another's constitutional 
 right^."^ Constitutional deprivations caused by other students 
lic schools. 
172. For example, the Utah legislature has considered the impact that 8 1983 
claims will have on the state's educational system. MINUTES OF THE EDUCATION 
INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 4-6 (April 27, 1994) (copy on file 
with author) (discussing whether the state wanted schools to be liable under O 
1983 or whether state legislative actions should be taken to protect public schools); 
see abo MINUTES OF THE EDUCATION I TERIM C O M ~ E E  OF THE UTAH LEGISLA- 
TURE 3-4 (May 18, 1994) (copy on file with author) (discussing 5 1983 liability for 
public schools). Conversely, the fear of 8 1983 claims may motivate state and local 
officials to legislate corrective action to help eliminate the problems in our public 
schools; cf. MINUTES OF THE EDUCATION INTERIM COMMPITEE OF THE UTAH LEGIS- 
LATURE 5 (April 27, 1994) (copy on file with author) (stating that school "districts 
need to be accountable and a t  the same time enjoy some aspects of immunity"). 
173. For example, Utah is currently experimenting with the Centennial School 
Program. Part of the theory of centennial schools is increasing site-based decision 
making, a move towards decentralization. Whether such policies are good or bad, 
effective or ineffective is irrelevant. An overreaction by the state legislature to a 
perceived threat may take away the opportunity to experiment and explore edu- 
cational alternatives. 
174. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961), o v e d e d  in part by 
Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
175. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91; see supra part I.B. 
176. Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978). 
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goes beyond the historical scope and intent of section 1983 as 
explained in Monroe and Monell.'" 
Sixth, ironically, broadly construing a special relationship 
may discourage socially beneficial programs. For example, a 
state may repeal the mandatory attendance statute in hopes of 
avoiding liability under section 1983. Such a move may put 
more children on the streets and lead to more injuries and 
death. Granted this is an extreme example and unlikely to 
happen, but the reality is that nobody knows how the states 
will react if they feel threatened or ~verburdened."~ Since 
education and social service programs are self-imposed by the 
states, such programs may be limited because of increased 
liability or a perceived threat of increased liability. Judicial 
activism sometimes creates more harm than good. Section 1983 
will provide little relief for victims and has the propensity for 
negative change in our educational system. Given the alterna- 
tives, the bright-line test used by the courts may not be so bad 
after all. 
c. The resident school exception. In contrast t o  normal 
public school cases, resident schools have a special relationship 
with their students.179 Only two circuit courts have addressed 
this question, and both held that a special relationship exist- 
ed?' Residential schools were distinguished from normal 
public schools in four ways. First, the school has twenty-four 
hour custody of the student.''' Second, the student in Walton 
was a disabled student who lacked "basic communications 
skills that a normal child would possess."182 Third, the stu- 
dent was not free to leave when he was in the custody of the 
177. Monroe, 365 U.S. at  188-91; Monell, 436 U.S. at  691-92. 
178. For example, California is currently struggling with Proposition 187. This 
proposition denies illegal immigrants access to state social services and education. 
Although the Proposition may be held unconstitutional under Plyex, v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982), the issue illustrates the frustration of individuals and their overre- 
action. People are willing to do extreme things to avoid financial burdens. 
179. See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th. Cir. 1994) (residential 
student at  school for the deaf had a special relationship with the school, but the 
superintendent was not liable under 5 1983 for sexual assault by another student 
because the superintendent's conduct did not amount to deliberate indifference); 
Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (a residential student at a school 
for the deaf had a special relationship with the school, but school officials were not 
liable under 5 1983 for sexual assault by a classmate because their duty was not 
clearly established at the time of the assault). 
180. Walton, 20 F.3d a t  1355; Spivey, 29 F.3d at  1524. 
181. Walton, 20 F.3d a t  1355; Spivey, 29 F.3d at  1525. 
182. Walton, 20 F.3d a t  1355. 
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scho01.'~ Finally, the state assumed responsibility for the 
student's basic needs such as food, clothing,-and shelter.'" 
These four factors clearly put the resident school cases 
within the DeShaney Court's special relationship exception. 
The school not only assumed the educational responsibilities, 
but also the primary custodial responsibilities.'" The key fac- 
tors seem to be twenty-four hour custody and control over basic 
needs.'" Under such conditions, a special relationship was 
created. 18' 
3. The middle ground to a special relationship in public 
schools: bifurcating state actors fron other students 
Section 1983 claims in which a teacher causes the depriva- 
tion are distinguishable from cases in which the deprivation is 
caused by other students.18' The factual difference is twofold. 
First, students are in a more vulnerable position vis-a-vis 
school officials, since officials are looked upon as authority 
figures.'* Second, school officials are state actors who act 
under color of law.lgo Although the vulnerability argument 
infers a special relationship,lg' the focus should be on the de- 
privation caused by a state actor. Under the state actor analy- 
sis, there is no need for a special relationship analysis to show 
183. Id. 
184. Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1525. 
185. Id. at 1524. 
186. Id. at 1524-25. 
187. It is worth noting that both of these cases occurred in circuits that have 
addressed special relationships in the non-residential school context. In Spivey, the 
court carefully distinguished the residential school cases from day school cases, 
stating that "it was still the children's parents who had ultimate control of their 
basic needs." Spivey, 29 F.3d at  1525. Walton was also distinguished h m  the 
nonresidential schools, but in a later Fifth Circuit case. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). Leffdl distinguished itself from Walton 
for the following reasons: the school in question was "not a school for the disabled, 
nor is it a boarding school with twenty-four hour custody of its students." Id. a t  
529; cf. Spivey, 29 F.3d at  1524-25 (involving a deaf student under the twenty-four 
hour care of a residential school). 
188. See Leffall, 28 F.3d a t  528-29; Gilbert, supra note 116, at 502-09. 
189. Gilbert, supra note 116, at  504. 
190. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, 115 S.  Ct. 70 (1994). 
191. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 528-29 ("The special relationship doctrine is properly 
invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable 
when it is the conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed a person's con- 
stitutional rights."). 
266 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995 
causation from the school because there is a state actor.lg2 
The state actor's supervisor and the school district could be 
held liable if they acted with deliberate indifference.lg3 This 
approach allows section 1983 claims against school officials 
without invoking the special relationship analysis. This analy- 
sis allows the court to avoid the quagmire of student inflicted 
deprivations by using the bright-line test that there are no 
special relationships. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 1983 is complex as walking through a mine field: 
one is uncertain where to step next. Although commentators do 
not like the bright-line approach, they seem to oversimplifg the 
impact of exposing schools to more liability. Even though 
schools still have the deliberate indifference buffer, the expense 
of simply defending suits could be enormous. Contrary to the 
arguments of commentators, the circuits bright-line approach is 
grounded in firm public policy. Historically, it avoids the affix- 
mative duty concerns implicitly rejected by Congress in the 
Sherman Amendments and expressly by the Court in 
DeShaney. Practically, given the complexity of section 1983, it 
is somewhat refreshing to see a bright-line test that facilitates 
the judicial process and puts everyone on notice as to what 
their rights are. Philosophically, states will be encouraged to 
structure the educational system based on what will be effec- 
tive to remedy violence in schools rather than how to avoid 
potential liability. 
As commentators admit, permitting a special relationship 
in  public schools will only help the few who can overcome the 
deliberate indifference threshold. In an  attempt to help the few, 
constitutional rights are turning into nothing more than com- 
mon torts while not even trying to catch the actual tortfeasor. 
To avoid this problem, courts should continue the practice 
of disallowing section 1983 claims against public schools for 
peer abuse. If a remedy is needed, the cause of action should be 
provided by state tort law through the legislative process. If the 
state fails to provide relief, a party could bring a federal action 
against the school for prospective injundive relief or lobby the 
legislature to make desirable, constructive changes. Additional- 
192. Id. 
193. See, e.g., Doe, 15 F.3d at 456-58. 
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ly, an action could be brought against the tortfeasor student. 
But alas, the student does not have the deep pockets; and was 
it not the school's deep pockets that prompted the action 
against the school in the first place? 
Robert L. Phillips 
